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The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA) terminated federal benefits to many immigrants. The Balanced Budget 
Act of 1997 (BBA) only partially restored these benefits to select immigrants who 
lawfully resided in the United States before August 22, 1996. Professor Francis dis­
cusses how these statutory provisions particularly devastate elderly immigrants.
Professor Francis questions the morality of the congressional policy to end im­
migrants' dependence on public welfare benefits by analyzing whether Congress's 
justifications, which rely on principles of self-sufficiency, nondependency, and 
nonencouragement, really apply to elderly immigrants. The author finds that the 
statutes' termination of federal benefits is immoral when applied to elderly immi­
grants first because it is unlikely to motivate the typical elderly immigrant to become 
self-sufficient. She then argues that PRWORA denies the legitimate expectations of 
elderly immigrants, their relatives, and their communities; PRWORA is unfeasible; it 
discriminates; and it is uncompassionate and unfair to elderly immigrants, their rela­
tives, and their communities. The author argues that the BBA does not cure 
PRWORA’s defects because it denies and does not accommodate the unforeseeable 
disasters that strike elderly immigrants. Professor Francis concludes that Congress
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should restore federal benefits to elderly immigrants, at least to the point of providing 
a safety net.
In 1996, many elderly legal immigrants in the 
United States nearly lost their entire social safety net. The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA)1 would have ended federal means-tested benefits for most 
legal immigrants.2 For the elderly, particularly the incompetent or ill, 
the most crucial losses would have been Supplemental Security In­
come (SSI) and Medicaid eligibility, including payment of nursing 
home charges. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA)3 restored the 
most important of these losses to immigrants already in the United 
States before August 22, 1996.4 However, the BBA did not restore all 
losses, even for those immigrants in the United States before the cutoff 
date.5 Immigrants who arrive in the United States after August 22,
1996, remain subject to the PRWORA restrictions.6 Moreover, the pe­
riod between the enactment of PRWORA and the enactment of the 
BBA was a time of frightening uncertainty for legal immigrants and a 
reminder of the fragility of their hold on social safety-net benefits.
This article begins by outlining the situation of elderly legal im­
migrants as it would have been had PRWORA continued to hold 
sway. It then outlines the current situation of partially restored bene­
fits for these immigrants. I then examine and criticize arguments that 
were given in Congress for PRWORA’s reduction of benefits. Next, I 
turn to the decision in the BBA to restore benefits to legal immigrants 
who arrived in the United States before PRWORA, but not to those 
who arrived afterwards. The principal reason offered for the distinc­
tion is that later arrivals are now on notice that they will be ineligible 
for federal means-tested benefits and that they therefore come to the 
United States with no legitimate expectations of safety-net support. I 
argue that this distinction cannot be justified and that safety-net bene­
fits should be restored for all legal immigrants, including those arriv­
ing in the United States after August 22, 1996.
230 The Elder Law Journal
1. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 [hereinafter PRWORA].
2. These provisions were enacted in PRWORA’s Title IV, which was entitled 
“Restricting Welfare and Public Benefits for Aliens.” Id. § 400, 110 Stat. at 2260.
3. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997) 
[hereinafter BBA].
4. See id. § 5301, 111 Stat. at 597.
5. See id.
6. See id.
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I. PRWORA and the Loss of Benefits for Legal Immigrants
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia­
tion Act of 1996 was a far-reaching reform of the welfare system in the 
United States. The Act’s overall goal was to move long-term welfare 
recipients into the work force and to transform welfare into a system 
of temporary support for those in crisis. Whatever judgment might be 
made about this overall approach, it is not a strategy that easily ap­
plies either to the very old (who have effectively left the work force) or 
to those who lack the cognitive or the physical capacities to work at 
any given time. Yet Congress decided in PRWORA to exclude legal 
immigrants from federal means-tested benefits apparently without at­
tention to these concerns.7
The specifics of PRWORA were set out in some highly technical 
concepts. The first is that of a “qualified immigrant,” an immigrant 
who has been admitted to the United States legally, for permanent 
residence, who has been granted asylum, who has been granted refu­
gee status, or who has been permitted to stay in the United States 
under certain other limited bases.8 “Qualified” immigrants are those 
who without PRWORA would have had benefits eligibility; it is im­
portant to emphasize that PRWORA’s limitation of benefits applied 
to immigrants whose presence in the United States was both legal and 
for the long term. Nonetheless, PRWORA excluded nearly all of the 
qualified from benefits eligibility. There were a few, limited excep­
tions to the reach of PRWORA exclusion. First, legal immigrants 
would remain eligible if they had worked at least forty qualifying 
quarters, quarters in which they earned at least a minimum amount 
and did not receive any federal means-tested benefit.9 The theory 
here may have been that ten years of paying taxes should vest eligibil­
ity for benefits paid from tax dollars. Legal immigrants could gain 
this eligibility vicariously through quarters worked by a spouse or a
7. Another consideration behind PRWORA was saving money, and the ex­
clusion of legal immigrants was expected to yield a significant proportion of the 
overall savings. Much of the savings would have come from elderly immigrants: 
estimates were that 67% of the 500,000 who stood to lose SSI were over 65 years 
old, 41% were over 75 years old, and 39,000 were nursing home residents. See 
Memorandum from F. William McCalpin, Chair, Commission on Legal Problems 
of the Elderly, American Bar Association & Roger A. Clay, Jr., Chair, Commission 
on Homelessness & Poverty, American Bar Association, to the Commission on 
Mental and Physical Disability Law, et al. 2 (May 27, 1997) (on file with author).
8. See PRWORA § 431(b), 110 Stat. at 2274.
9. PRWORA § 402(a)(2)(B), 110 Stat. at 2262. The minimum amount for a 
qualifying quarter in 1997 was $670. Id.
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parent,10 but there are significant gaps in this vicarious eligibility. Di­
vorced spouses could no longer claim quarters vicariously, even for 
those quarters accumulated before the time of the divorce.11 Children 
could only lay vicarious claim to quarters worked by a parent before 
the child’s eighteenth birthday;12 thus disabled children who might 
never be able to work but who arrived in the United States over the 
age of eight were effectively precluded from vicarious eligibility, even 
if their parents worked every quarter after the date of their arrival.
PRWORA’s second exception to denial of benefits eligibility for 
qualified immigrants applies to legal immigrants on active military 
duty13 or honorably discharged from the military.14 These immigrants 
would remain eligible for benefits as would spouses and unmarried 
dependent children who could vicariously benefit from the military 
status exception.15 Finally, refugees to whom the government granted 
asylum or withheld deportation would also remain eligible for bene­
fits for five more years.16
PRWORA exclusions would have been particularly devastating 
for elderly immigrants for several reasons. Although immigrants 
could attribute their sponsors’ income to the income eligibility deter­
mination, PRWORA did not provide that immigrants could attribute 
their children’s quarters to their forty-quarter requirement. Therefore, 
immigrants entering the United States past retirement age, such as 
parents joining their children, would be unable to obtain eligibility 
from their children’s work or military service. In addition, elderly im­
migrant spouses would lose their benefits upon divorce if they origi­
nally had become eligible for the benefits vicariously, whether or not 
they had desired the divorce. Imagine the difficult choice faced by an 
elderly person with a permanently demented spouse, who would like 
to divorce and remarry but recognizes that the cost will be the de­
mented spouse’s loss of safety-net benefits.
To be sure, PRWORA left one infallible way for legal immigrants 
to remain eligible for federal benefits: become citizens. This way too, 
however, poses particular difficulties for the elderly. Becoming a citi­
232 The Elder Law journal
10. See id. § 435(1), 110 Stat. at 2275.
11. See id. § 435(2), 110 Stat. at 2275.
12. See id. § 435(1), 110 Stat. at 2275.
13. See id. § 402(a)(2)(C)(ii), 110 Stat. at 2263.
14. See id. § 402(a)(2)(C)(i), 110 Stat. at 2263.
15. See id. § 402(b)(2)(C)(iii), 110 Stat. at 2265.
16. See id. § 402(b)(2)(A), 110 Stat. at 2264.
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zen, in addition to meeting residency and character requirements,17 
requires passing a citizenship test in English and swearing an oath.18 
In 1994, Congress amended the Immigration and Naturalization Act19 
to permit persons with disabilities to apply for a waiver of the English 
and citizenship requirements.20 In July of 1997, the INS promulgated 
regulations implementing the disability waiver.21 Only persons with 
disabilities may apply for the waivers; elderly persons whose ability 
to learn English or civics is complicated by Alzheimer’s disease would 
be a perfect example. Being elderly itself, however, is not a disability; 
and to the extent that elderly noncitizens, for whatever non-disability- 
based reasons, face barriers to learning English, they will not be eligi­
ble for waivers. In addition, designated locations for the test may be 
difficult to reach for people who lack transportation or who have lim­
ited mobility. Distant locations may also seem remote and frightening 
for elderly persons who are not used to moving around American cit­
ies on their own; this remoteness may be compounded by the require­
ment at some centers that people coming for the test enter the testing 
center alone and without any support persons. Although at least 
some INS centers have demonstrated willingness to make accommo­
dations for disabled persons with respect to the citizenship test, abso­
lutely no waivers are allowed for the requirement that the applicant 
for citizenship be able to swear a meaningful oath.22 The result is that 
elderly persons who are too demented to understand and swear the 
citizenship oath are foreclosed from obtaining eligibility through the 
citizenship process.23
The list of benefits that would have been lost under PRWORA is 
significant. PRWORA would have denied nonqualified immigrants, 
such as students lawfully in the United States but not on a permanent
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17. See 8-U.S.C. § 1423(a)(1), (2) (1994).
18. See 8 C.F.R. § 301.1(b) (1997).
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b).
20. See Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1423(b)(1) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 103-416, tit. I, § 108(a), 108 
Stat. 4306, 4309-10).
21. 8 C.F.R. § 3.12.1(b)(3).
22. See 8 C.F.R. § 301.1. See Note, The Functionality of Citizenship, 110 H arv . L. 
Rev. 1814 (1997), for a defense of the oath requirement as necessary to “meaning­
ful” citizenship.
23. For stories describing the oath requirement’s impact on persons with dis­
abilities such as cerebral palsy or Alzheimer’s disease, see Yvette Cabrera, Disabled 
Immigrants Gain Citizenship Chance, L.A. D a ily  News, July 4, 1997, at N l; Miguel 
Perez, Citizenship Hurdle Absurd for Many Elderly, Disabled, The Record, Mar. 23,
1997, Review & Outlook, at 4.
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basis, nearly all benefits. Nonqualified immigrants would be ineligi­
ble for any federal public benefits, including:
(A) any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial 
license provided by an agency of the United States or by appro­
priate funds of the United States; and (B) and retirement, welfare, 
health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary edu­
cation, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other simi­
lar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an 
individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of 
the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States.24
The only benefits for which nonqualified immigrants would have re­
mained eligible were immunizations—medical care that benefits 
others—and emergency medical and disaster relief.25
Qualified immigrants did not face a much better situation with 
respect to benefits lost. Qualified immigrants would have been cate­
gorically ineligible for “specified federal programs,” such as food 
stamps and SSI.26 The federal government provides SSI to aged and 
disabled persons who are indigent but ineligible for Social Security 
benefits. PRWORA left to the states’ discretion qualified immigrants’ 
eligibility for “designated federal programs,” including Medicaid, Ti­
tle XX block grant programs, and Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF).27 However, PRWORA still placed significant limits 
on states’ determination of eligibility for federal benefits. Qualified 
immigrants remained categorically ineligible for any “means-tested 
federal public benefits” for five years after arriving in the United 
States.28 Thereafter, the income of their sponsors and their spouse was 
to be “deemed” income of the immigrant for the purpose of eligibility 
determinations for means-tested benefits.29 Interim INS regulations 
enforcing this provision provide for contractual enforcement of spon­
sorship support obligations by the federal government.30
This structure of benefit loss, like the structure of exclusions, 
would have hit the elderly particularly hard. Medicaid is a major
24. PRWORA § 401(c)(1)(A), (B), 110 Stat. at 2262.
25. See id.
26. See PRWORA § 402(a)(3), 110 Stat. at 2264.
27. See id. § 402(b)(3), 110 Stat. at 2265.
28. Id. § 403(a), 110 Stat. at 2265.
29. See id. § 421(a), 110 Stat. at 2270.
30. The interim rules also require that the sponsor demonstrate income above 
125% of the federal poverty guidelines for family size, that the sponsor’s family 
size include the sponsored immigrant(s), and that family members whose income 
is counted toward the 125% be contractually obligated for support. See Affidavits 
of Support on Behalf of Immigrants, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,346 (1997) (to be codified at 8 
C.F.R. pt. 213a).
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payor of nursing home care.31 After PRWORA, some nursing homes 
refused admission to elderly noncitizens whether or not they risked 
losing benefits eligibility.32 Elderly immigrants who do not meet the 
requirement of forty credited quarters are not eligible for Medicare, 
moreover, and may need to turn to Medicaid for access to health care 
more generally. Although PRWORA allowed states the option to 
open Medicaid eligibility to qualified immigrants residing in the coun­
try for at least five years,33 it limited the program funds in a fixed 
federal block grant.34 After Congress enacted PRWORA, states gave 
mixed signals about their willingness to open Medicaid programs to 
qualified immigrants. SSI and food stamps are also programs that are 
particularly important to the support of elderly immigrants living in 
poverty who have not met the Social Security requirement of forty 
qualifying quarters.35 It is important to note as well that many elderly 
immigrants who fail to meet the forty-quarter requirement were in the 
work force, but in job sectors where the requirement that employers 
report income and pay FICA was unevenly enforced: job areas such 
as domestic work, child care, or agricultural labor.
One of the most significant problems for the states was the sheer 
ability to assume the expenses of extending Medicaid benefits without 
additional federal dollars.36 The numbers of qualified immigrants, es­
pecially elderly qualified immigrants, are heavily concentrated in 
some districts, particularly in California, New York, and Florida. 
Dade County, Florida, alone would have faced a burden of 54,000 
newly ineligible immigrants who had been receiving benefits37—ten
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31. Approximately one-half of the Medicaid budget is spent on nursing home 
care for indigent elderly people. See Valentine M. Villa et al., Economic Diversity 
and an Aging Population: The Impact of Public Policy and Economic Trends, G e n e r a ­
t io n s ,  Summer 1997, at 13, 15.
32. See Legal Immigrants Denied NH Admission, Brow n U Long-Term Care 
Q u a lity  Advisor, July 14, 1997, at 5.
33. See PRWORA § 403(a), 110 Stat. at 2265.
34. See id. §§ 401-403, 110 Stat. at 2261-67.
35. Although immigrants who have lived in the United States for a long time 
are not more likely to use public benefits than citizens, elderly immigrants are 
more likely to depend on Medicaid and food stamps than elderly citizens (99% of 
whom receive Medicare). See Nancy San Martin, Immigrants Arrive Poor, Then 
Thrive, Study Shows, Sun-Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Apr. 9, 1997, at 1A.
36. For a description of the anticipated squeeze in Hawaii, a state with a sig­
nificant immigrant population and the longest life expectancy in the nation, see 
Lucy Joikel, Sink or Swim: Hawaii's Multibillion Dollar Healthcare Industry Faces a 
Sea of Change, Haw. Bus., Sept. 1996, at 10.
37. See Jim Oliphant, Unlikely Team Rises to Aid of Immigrants, Brow ard D a ily  
Bus. Rev., May 30, 1997, at A6.
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percent of the estimated national total of one-half million.38 New York 
City estimated a new burden of 110,000 newly ineligible immigrants— 
twenty percent of the estimated national total.39
PRWORA, therefore, caused legal immigrants great concern 
about their uncertain futures in the United States. Appeals from 
many directions led Congress to pass the Balanced Budget Act of
1997, which amended PRWORA only a month before its eligibility 
limitations were to begin effect.
II. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and the Partial 
Restoration of Benefits to Legal Immigrants
The BBA partially repaired the safety net of benefits to some 
qualified legal immigrants. Immigrants who either received SSI or re­
sided lawfully in the country before PRWORA’s original enactment 
(August 22, 1996) remained eligible for SSI.40 In addition, immigrants 
who received SSI were derivatively eligible for Medicaid, but not de­
rivatively eligible for food stamps.41 The benefits restored by the BBA, 
even if incomplete, were important to immigrants lawfully residing in 
the country before PRWORA’s enactment.
The BBA did not change PRWORA’s impact on immigrants ar­
riving in this country after PRWORA’s enactment.42 Thus, immi­
grants arriving after PRWORA’s enactment remain ineligible for SSI 
or food stamps. Their eligibility for designated federal programs such 
as Medicaid and TANF under the state block grants program depends 
upon the states in which they live.43 They are ineligible for all means- 
tested federal public benefits for five years; thereafter, their sponsors’ 
and spouses’ incomes are deemed to be theirs.44 These deeming pro­
visions will be enforced contractually by the federal government; the 
government will seek restitution from the sponsor for any means- 
tested federal benefit received by a sponsored immigrant.45
236 The Elder Law Journal
38. See Test Waivers for Citizenship Won't Stop Lawsuit, Disability Advocates Say, 
Immigr. Advisor, May 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, ASAP II file.
39. See id. .
40. See BBA §§ 5301(a)-(b), 111 Stat. at 597-98.
41. See id. § 5305(b), 111 Stat. at 597-98.
42. See id. § 5301, 111 Stat. at 597.
43. See PRWORA § 402, 110 Stat. at 2262.
44. See id. §§ 403(a), 421(a), 110 Stat. at 2265, 2270.
45. See id. § 421(c), 110 Stat. at 2270.
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Perhaps the only cause for optimism for immigrants arriving af­
ter August 22, 1996, may be that the Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS) has announced a narrow construction of the 
statutory term “federal means-tested public benefit.” The DHHS has 
construed “federal means-tested public benefit” to include only 
mandatory, means-tested programs, i.e., Medicaid and TANF.46 
Although PRWORA explicitly excludes certain programs such as 
school lunches,47 the DHHS interpreted PRWORA also to exclude dis­
cretionary spending programs, such as child care assistance.48
The BBA thus creates a radical dichotomy between the treatment 
of immigrants who arrived in the United States before PRWORA’s 
enactment and the treatment of immigrants who arrived after 
PRWORA’s enactment. In the remainder of this article I argue, first, 
that the congressional rationale for the PRWORA restrictions cannot 
be defended morally and, second, that the reasons offered for limiting 
the BBA restorations to immigrants present in the United States before 
PRWORA cannot be sustained.
III. Arguments Offered in Support of the Restrictions: An 
Ethical Critique
As support for the PRWORA restrictions, Congress put forth the 
principle of self-sufficiency as what it took to be the basic philosophy 
of American immigration policy.49 It understood two more specific 
policy objectives as corollaries to the basic principle of self-sufficiency. 
The first corollary might be called the principle of nondependency: 
immigrants should not depend on public welfare benefits to meet 
their needs. Instead, they should rely on their own efforts, the re­
sources of their families and sponsors, and the assistance of private 
charitable agencies.50 The second corollary might be called the 
nonencouragement principle: the availability of public benefits 
should not serve as an incentive for immigrants to come to the United
46. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996; Interpretation of “Federal Means-Tested Public Benefit,” 62 Fed. Reg. 42,256 
(1997).
47. See PRWORA § 422(b)(3), 110 Stat. at 2271.
48. See Interpretation of “Federal Means-Tested Public Benefit,” 62 Fed. Reg. 
at 45,257.
49. See PRWORA § 400(1), 110 Stat. at 2260.
50. See id. § 400(2)(A), 110 Stat. at 2260.
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States.51 Congress asserted, however, that in its judgment current im­
migration policy was not assuring self-reliance and that immigrants 
were increasingly depending on public benefits for support.52 Con­
gress therefore concluded—no doubt in anticipation of potential equal 
protection challenges—that compelling federal interests supported the 
PRWORA restrictions.53
In this discussion, my principal focus will be the ethical rather 
than the empirical claims asserted in PRWORA’s statement of con­
gressional policy, but the fact that there are serious reasons to ques­
tion the empirical claims should not go unremarked. Although 
elderly immigrants are somewhat more likely to depend on public 
benefits than elderly nonimmigrants, long-term immigrants are not 
more likely to depend on them overall.54 The explanation for the 
modest difference in rates among the elderly may be that elderly im­
migrants are somewhat less likely than nonimmigrants to be eligible 
for other elements of the social safety net, Social Security and Medi­
care in particular. Congress offered no data in support of the claim 
that immigrants are drawn to the United States by generous public 
benefits. In any event, were this the concern, it could be addressed 
more directly by immigration policies such as emphasizing skills or 
sponsorship.
The ethical argument I develop here makes use of variations on a 
typical example of those who stand to lose benefits under PRWORA. 
As initially described, my case is a sympathetic one for those who 
oppose the termination of benefits. I will consider less sympathetic 
variations, as the argument progresses, in order to consider the factors 
that make a moral difference. I will call my exemplar Mrs. I. She is a 
woman because the majority of nursing home residents who depend 
on Medicaid are women. Mrs. I is an elderly noncitizen who came to 
the United States with her husband over forty years ago. She has not 
obtained the forty quarters needed to qualify for Social Security or 
Medicare or to be exempt from the PRWORA limits. Her husband 
died before working a full forty quarters. She supported herself for 
many years by working as a domestic. Although she paid income 
taxes, neither she nor her employer paid FICA on her earnings. When 
Mrs. I became too ill to work, she lived with an adult daughter for
238 The Elder Law Journal
51. See id. § 400(2)(A), (B), 110 Stat. at 2260.
52. See id. § 400(3), (4), 110 Stat. at 2260.
53. See id. § 400(5), (6), 110 Stat. at 2260.
54. See San Martin, supra note 35, at Al.
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several years. Now in the advanced stages of Alzheimer’s disease, 
Mrs. I lives in a nursing home; her only sources of support are SSI and 
Medicaid. Her Alzheimer’s disease is too advanced for her to be able 
to take a meaningful oath and meet the requirements for citizenship. 
Because there are morally significant differences between the situa­
tions of those already here who would have lost their benefits under 
PRWORA and the situations of later comers who will be ineligible for 
benefits under the BBA, I begin with a critique of the PRWORA 
restrictions.
A. PRWORA and Legitimate Expectations
In its original form, PRWORA would have resulted in the termi­
nation of Mrs. Fs SSI income and food stamps. PRWORA would also 
have ended her Medicaid and other means-tested federal benefits if 
her home state did not choose to include her in these programs. Con­
gress’s articulated principles in PRWORA, however, do not justify 
cutting these benefits for incompetent elder immigrants like Mrs. I. 
Consider first the nonencouragement principle. Mrs. Fs decision to 
come to the United States was made many years ago; she is now in­
competent and too ill to engage in any decision making about her sta­
tus. Incentives are a thing of the past for her; they do not operate 
now.
If Mrs. I were competent, by contrast, the nonencouragement 
principle might seem relevant. Incentives might operate, depending 
on her physical condition: the knowledge that she was at risk of los­
ing her benefits might lead her to reconsider whether she should stay 
in the United States or attempt to return to her country of origin. The 
incentives, however, are unlikely to encourage her to become self-suf­
ficient in the United States. Because she is not a recent arrival, and 
because all of her family and her connections are in the United States, 
it is far more likely that the incentive created for the competent elderly 
would have been the incentive to become citizens. Indeed, the rush of 
citizenship applications in the wake of PRWORA indicates that this 
was exactly the impact of PRWORA on those able to take advantage 
of the citizenship option.55 These cases suggest that the real target of 
nonencouragement under PRWORA was people who had not yet ar­
rived in the United States, the group still targeted for the loss of bene­
fits under the BBA. The situation of this group is addressed below.
55. See Cabrera, supra note 23.
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The principle of nondependency poses a somewhat more com­
plicated question with respect to incompetent patients such as Mrs. I. 
Mrs. I’s situation is what it is; planning for nondependency is not an 
option for her. Her options may be very limited. Certainly, she can­
not be expected to become self-sufficient if she has advanced 
Alzheimer’s disease. She may no longer have family or sponsors with 
resources to help out; indeed, she may have outlived these possible 
sources of support. Her only source for replacement of the loss of SSI 
and Medicaid funds, as well as other federal benefits, would be pri­
vate charity. If she is significantly demented, however, she will be 
unable to make these arrangements on her own. The upshot of 
PRWORA in these cases, then, would be to rely on the hope that fami­
lies, communities, or private charities would step in and take up sup­
port for the Mrs. Is of our world who can no longer rely on the federal 
government. This shift would impose a major new burden on private 
charities, one that they may not have the resources to meet and cer­
tainly would not have a legal obligation to meet. Thus, Mrs. I would 
have no assurance that her Medicaid bills would continue to be paid. 
Nursing homes, in the wake of PRWORA, raised concerns about 
where patients like Mrs. I were to go.
Suppose, on the other hand, that Mrs. I were competent, or that 
her sponsor, spouse, or family were available. A proponent of the 
principle of nondependency might argue that it would be justifiable to 
require Mrs. I to figure out how to provide for herself or to rely on her 
available sources of support. As to Mrs. I herself, there are several 
reasons why it would be wrong to interpret the principle of 
nondependency to require her to provide for herself. The first reason 
is that to do so would be a radical change in the long-standing rules 
that applied to her. I have argued elsewhere that legitimate expecta­
tions of a benefit are independent moral reasons for providing that 
benefit.56 That is, the fact that someone has come to count on a bene­
fit, such as Medicaid or Medicare, legitimately is a special, moral rea­
son for providing that benefit. Expectations are legitimate when they 
are reasonable, when they have been encouraged by existing rules or 
policies, and when they are long-standing. Their importance is 
heightened when they also relate to means for respecting the basic 
needs and integrity of persons, and when they are supported by other
56. See Leslie Pickering Francis, Consumer Expectations and Access to Health 
Care, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1881 (1992).
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moral claims, such as claims of justice. Mrs. I’s expectations of the 
availability of SSI and Medicaid are particularly powerful examples of 
legitimate expectations. They were reasonable and encouraged in 
light of the long-standing federal commitment to these programs. The 
unevenness of federal enforcement policy with respect to FICA, and 
Mrs. I ’s own acceptance of her employer’s failure to pay, occurred 
when SSI and Medicaid were last resort forms of support for elderly 
immigrants who failed to qualify for Social Security or Medicare. Fi­
nally, their legitimacy is enhanced by their importance to Mrs. I and 
by claims of justice. The availability of SSI and Medicaid are crucial to 
Mrs. I’s ability to pay for basic and unpredictable necessities of life. 
Mrs. I cannot anticipate whether she will suffer catastrophic health 
needs or whether she will become disabled and unable to work. In 
this unpredictability, the case for the legitimacy of Mrs. I ’s expecta­
tions of SSI and Medicaid are arguably even stronger than the legiti­
macy of her expectations of food stamps: although food is a basic 
necessity of life, food needs are relatively stable and predictable. On 
at least those views of justice that hold that there is a social responsi­
bility to provide for basic health needs of those who cannot provide 
them for themselves, it would be unjust to deny Mrs. I basic health 
care for which she is unable to pay. Mrs. I’s legitimate expectations of 
the safety net that had been in place for many years for people such as 
herself are thus one reason why it would be wrong to apply the prin­
ciple of nondependency to her situation.
A second reason why it would be wrong to apply the principle 
of nondependency to require Mrs. I to provide for her own needs is 
that even in the best case scenario it is unlikely that she will be able to 
do so. Applying the principle of nondependency to Mrs. I herself 
would require her to go back to work. The likely range of jobs avail­
able to a woman of her age and skills is limited—perhaps domestic, 
child care worker, or server at a fast food establishment. From these 
jobs, she might be able to earn enough to pay for her basic living ex­
penses, but it is much more questionable whether she would be able 
to find a job that would provide her with health insurance or the pos­
sibility of retirement benefits. At best, Mrs. I can be expected to use 
work to make up the loss of benefits such as food stamps or subsi­
dized housing. If Mrs. I has health needs—and, of course, if she be­
comes disabled—the goal of requiring her to be self-sufficient will 
simply be unmet. Once again, Mrs. I will be dependent on private 
charity to make up the gap.
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A third reason why it would be wrong to apply the principle of 
nondependency to Mrs. I is that it would treat her very differently 
from the elderly who are citizens. Requiring that elderly immigrants 
go back to work to support themselves imposes a lifetime burden on 
them that is not imposed on citizens. This burden is especially unfair 
to those who were already elderly or disabled and in the United States 
at the time of the rules change, and thus unable to take the new rules 
into account in planning how to live without safety-net benefits. Con­
sider the tragic example related by Representative Hinojosa of Texas, 
in arguing for restoration of the benefits taken away by PRWORA for 
those already in the United States:
Mr. Rosendo Tijerina is a legal immigrant who has worked in 
Texas for eleven years. Last November he was involved in a seri­
ous auto accident. His legs and pelvis were crushed and his heart 
was injured as well. He is now totally disabled.
Yet under the welfare reform law, Mr. Tijerina is not eligible 
for supplemental security income. He has worked hard, paid his 
taxes, integrated himself and his family into his community and 
has been a contributor to our country’s economy. He deserves 
better treatment than this.57
Imposing this burden on people such as my hypothetical Mrs. I or the 
all-too-real Mr. Tijerina also places significant strains on community 
bonds. The practical effect of imposing a self-sufficiency requirement 
on people like Mrs. I would be to require them to work, quite literally 
until they can work no longer—perhaps even into their eighties or 
later. The failure to extend a safety net to those of an advanced age 
shows a quite remarkable lack of compassion. Finally, the incentive 
that is likely to be created by the PRWORA cutoff for competent peo­
ple in the situation of Mrs. I is to become citizens. Thus PRWORA is 
unlikely to accomplish the goal underlying the nondependency prin­
ciple in any event.
Until this point, I have considered applying the principle of 
nondependency to require Mrs. I to pay for her own needs. What 
about interpreting nondependency to require Mrs. Fs relatives or 
sponsor to come to her aid? This interpretation is found in a limited 
form in PRWORA’s deeming requirement, which would attribute the 
income of Mrs. Fs spouse or sponsor to her in the determination of 
her income eligibility for Medicaid.58 Defenders of the deeming re­
57. 143 C o n g . R ec. H4379 (d a ily  ed . Ju n e  25, 1997) (s ta te m e n t o f R ep. 
H in o jo sa).
58. See PRWORA § 421, 110 Stat. at 2270.
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quirement might argue that it is fair to require her spouse and sponsor 
to come to her aid. Defenders of the cutoff more generally might ar­
gue that it is fair to require noncitizens to turn to their families, 
friends, and communities if they cannot provide for their own needs. 
The arguments offered against relying on Mrs. I to provide for her 
own needs also apply to requiring Mrs. I to turn to such sources for 
whatever support they have available.
First of all, even for spouses and for sponsors, the deeming re­
quirements represent a major change in the rules of the game. The 
sponsorship of Mrs. I may have occurred many, many years ago, and 
the connection between Mrs. I and her sponsor may be attenuated or 
nonexistent. Like Mrs. I, her spouse may have legitimately expected 
that a safety net would be there for her and that, despite her need for 
nursing home care, he would be able to maintain independent living. 
Although children, other relatives, and close community members are 
not legally obligated to Mrs. I through the deeming requirements of 
PRWORA, they may have the need to come to her aid thrust upon 
them by her sudden loss of benefits. The result may be unanticipated, 
significant disruptions in their own lives. The expectations of a safety 
net for Mrs. I, on the part of her sponsor, spouse, or relatives, arguably 
meet the criteria for legitimate expectations: they may well have been 
long-standing and encouraged by policy, they may cut deeply into 
both Mrs. Fs and her family’s abilities to lead minimally decent lives, 
and they are supported by claims of justice.
Moreover, both those subject to the deeming requirements and 
others close to Mrs. I may be unable to do much to contribute to her 
support. They may quickly become impoverished themselves, facing 
the same restrictions as Mrs. I if they are noncitizens. If Mrs. Fs fam­
ily takes her in, one or more adult members may no longer be able to 
work. The costs of her home health care alone may derail even the 
most modest educational plans for children in the family.
Finally, significant issues of fairness are raised for her family or 
sponsors by Mrs. Fs need to turn to them for support. Mrs. Fs chil­
dren, for example, may be the only persons for her to turn to when 
she loses her SSI and Medicaid benefits. They will be faced with the 
choice of continuing to pay for her nursing home care, if they can; 
taking her in; or leaving her destitute and incompetent, with nowhere 
to go. This burden is not imposed on any other Americans, citizen or 
noncitizen. Even those who favor distinguishing citizens from nonci­
tizens should note that this burden may fall on citizens: Mrs. Fs chil­
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dren may have been bom in the United States or have become 
naturalized, even though she has not. Thus the result of the applica­
tion of the principle of nondependency to Mrs. I under PRWORA is 
the disappointment of legitimate expectations and the imposition of 
potentially devastating and unfair burdens on her spouse, other rela­
tives, or local communities.
PRWORA, to be sure, applied both to immigrants who had been 
in the United States for a very long time and to those newly arriving 
after the date of its enactment. Much of the concern voiced over 
PRWORA rested on the application of its changes to those who were 
already in the United States, perhaps for a lengthy period of time. As 
I have argued, applying both the nonencouragement and the 
nondependency principle to immigrants of long-standing duration is 
particularly problematic.59 The BBA, however, amended PRWORA to 
apply its restrictions only to those arriving after August 22, 1996.60 
Contractual enforcement of the deeming requirements applies only af­
ter the effective date of the interim deeming rule, December 19,1997.61 
Sponsors of this approach argued that it is both reasonable and fair to 
treat immigrants differently once they are warned of the new restric­
tions. Arguing in support of the BBA changes, Senator Lautenberg 
contended:
The conference report also restores a basic level of fairness for 
people who have come into this country legally, who have obeyed 
the law, paid their taxes, and then fate delivers them a disability 
whether through accident or just sickness. Last year the Congress 
pulled the rug out from under these people and eliminated their 
disability benefits; for some, the only provision that they have that 
enables them to get along. But today we are restoring that basic 
safety net. It is the right thing to do.62
But would restoring benefits to qualified immigrants arriving after 
August 22, 1996, also have been the right thing to do?
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59. See supra Part IILA.
60. See BBA § 5301, 111 Stat. at 597.
61. 62 Fed. Reg. 54,346 (1997) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 213a).
62. 143 C o n g . R ec . S8319 (daily ed. July 30, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
Lautenberg).
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B. The Balanced Budget Amendment and Fair Treatment of Newly Arrived 
Immigrants
Senator Wellstone called August 22, 1996, “an arbitrary date on 
the calendar.”63 So it is, except for the fact that after that date immi­
grants considering coming to the United States were on notice that 
Congress had acted to end the social safety net for immigrants. Pro­
ponents of the continued imposition of restrictions on after-arrivers 
argue that it is supported by the principle of nonencouragement—be­
cause we do not want to encourage immigration by the potentially 
dependent—and by the principle of nondependency—because it is 
fair to expect later arrivals to know that they will need to count on 
their own resources or their sponsor’s for support. For example, 
Daniel Stein, the Executive Director of the Federation for American 
Immigration Reform, argued on Talk of the Nation:
To the extent that you are taking welfare benefits away from 
American citizens, Americans aren’t getting quality public educa­
tion and other services. The broader policy question is clear: 
should we have an immigration program that allows people to 
bring elderly parents who are essentially past their working years 
and have them retire and be supported at taxpayer expense?64
The efforts to put new arrivals on notice of the new requirements 
are intensified by the interim rule concerning affidavits of support. 
Immigrants arriving to join family members or to take up employ­
ment in a family enterprise must demonstrate that they are not likely 
to become a public charge.65 To do this, the new immigrant must sup­
ply a sponsor, and the sponsor must file a support affidavit contractu­
ally obligating him to the federal government.66 In addition, the 
sponsor must prove a household income exceeding 125% of the fed­
eral poverty line.67 Notably, the affidavit also obligates the sponsor’s 
spouse and any household members whom the household income cal­
culation includes.68 A sponsor may pledge assets rather than income, 
but the assets must sufficiently support the immigrant at 125% of the 
poverty line for at least five years (the minimum period of ineligibility 
for federal means-tested public benefits for qualified immigrants even
63. 143 C o n g . R ec. S6780 (daily ed. June 27, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
Wellstone).
64. Talk of the Nation (National Public Radio broadcast, Mar. 19, 1997).
65. See Affidavits of Support on Behalf of Immigrants, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,346 
(1997) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 213a).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 54,347.
68. See id.
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if states choose to extend benefits afterwards).69 Sponsors must also 
agree to notify both the state and the federal government of any 
changes of address.70 Such sponsorship obligations cease only if the 
immigrant becomes naturalized, can be credited with forty quarters of 
work, or ceases to be a permanent resident of the United States. The 
sponsorship also ends when the immigrant or the sponsor dies.71
A crucial starting point for assessing the justifiability of continu­
ing to exclude after-arrivers from benefits is whether the notice given 
by PRWORA makes a moral difference. In one way, it does. The an­
nouncement that they cannot count on a safety net should be clear to 
immigrants arriving after that date, as well as their sponsors and per­
haps their families (although there is no guarantee of family knowl­
edge unless families are involved in sponsorship). An immigrant’s 
expectations of a safety net, then, would be neither reasonable nor en­
couraged. Indeed, this change is the very point of the nonencourage­
ment principle as part of American immigration policy. Thus if 
encouragement and reasonableness are necessary for the legitimacy of 
expectations, after-arrivers would no longer have legitimate expecta­
tions of a safety net and this argument for providing them with a net 
would no longer hold. It does not follow, however, that other moral 
reasons for the safety net would also collapse, or even that expecta­
tions in any form would be irrelevant to the issue of the restoration of 
benefits. I shall argue that the other moral reasons given for the resto­
ration of benefits to immigrants in the country before August 22,1996, 
also apply to after-arrivers, at least to the extent of guaranteeing them 
safety-net protections for health needs and disabilities.
A major concern about excluding those already here from bene­
fits was that the incentives sought to be created by PRWORA— 
nonencouragement and nondependency—were in fact unlikely to be 
created. There are similar questions about whether the new limits can 
be expected to discourage those who might have need of a safety net 
from coming to the United States. To be sure, after-arrivers have a 
new decision to make and new information with which to make it. 
Immigrants who know before arrival that they will have safety-net 
needs would rationally be discouraged by the PRWORA restrictions. 
These situations represent the intended goals of the new restrictions.
2 4 6  The Elder Law Journal
69. See id. at 54,349.
70. See id.
71. See id.
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For example, Daniel Stein, Executive Director of the Federation for 
American Immigration Reform, articulated this goal on Talk of the 
Nation: “The system should not allow immigrants to bring elderly 
parents here over the age of fifty-five as a general rule.”72 Another 
unarticulated and perhaps unrecognized but discouraged group will 
be parents of disabled children over the age of eight, who will never 
be able to achieve the forty quarters required for vesting through their 
parents and who may not be able to work or attain citizenship on their 
own. Questions about the fairness of these goals will be raised 
shortly, but to the extent that these groups will be discouraged by the 
restrictions, the nonencouragement principle might be thought to be 
achieving its goal.
Nonetheless, the new restrictions sweep far beyond 
nonencouragement of those with known needs. Those immigrants 
who come to the United States intending and able to work are not the 
targets of PRWORA nonencouragement. Yet they may well become 
those in need of safety-net benefits if unexpected disease or disability 
strikes. The PRWORA incentives will not discourage them from com­
ing to the United States unless they are so risk-averse that they would 
prefer keeping whatever safety nets are available in their countries of 
origin to coming to the United States without a safety net. Once here, 
they will not be able to prevent the need for benefits: disability or 
disease may strike without warning or control. PRWORA incentives 
may discourage immigration by the elderly and by parents of children 
with disabilities, but they will not prevent populations of newly ar­
rived immigrants who suffer catastrophes after arrival.
Another central concern raised about the PRWORA exclusions 
was their unfairness. The exclusions that continue in the BBA are also 
unfair for the same reasons. A way to begin to see the unfairness of 
the continued exclusions in the BBA is to consider the situation of peo­
ple who bring their parents over, sponsor them, and believe they have 
the resources to care for them, but then suffer catastrophic medical 
events themselves. Suppose, for example, that Mrs. I’s children ar­
rived in the United States a number of years ago and have become 
reasonably prosperous citizens. (Indeed, they may even have been 
bom in the United States during a time of Mrs. I’s former residency.) 
Suppose also that it has become increasingly difficult for Mrs. I to care 
for herself at home in her country of origin and that most of her rela­
72. Talk of the Nation, supra note 64.
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tives and friends there have died. She faces the prospect of a lonely 
old age with whatever safety net exists in her country of origin or the 
prospect of an old age cared for by her daughter but without any 
chance of receiving safety-net benefits. The only difference between 
the situation of Mrs. I and her daughter and the situation of countless 
other Americans and their aged parents is that Mrs. I has neither at­
tained citizenship nor met the PRWORA exemption requirements. 
Mrs. I had the bad luck to have catastrophe strike too soon, while 
others did not. To have bad timing affect the lives of both Mrs. I and 
her family in such devastating ways, while it does not affect the lives 
of others similarly situated, is deeply unfair.
Similarly unpredictable, moreover, is whether the catastrophes 
of disease or disability occur before or after arrival in the United 
States. To be sure, those who know that they are already in need of 
support before arrival know that the United States will not extend 
safety-net benefits to them. They will be discouraged from coming. 
But the consequences will be that families of the already disabled will 
be discouraged from reuniting, while families of those who do not yet 
know their needs will not be discouraged. Once again, whether fami­
lies suffer in this way is an arbitrary matter of timing and thus argua­
bly unfair.
In these situations, the goal of ordinary support for Mrs. I is at­
tainable from her family or sponsors. Such ordinary support, I would 
argue, is the appropriate scope of the principle of nondependency. 
Providing for Mrs. Fs ordinary living expenses is something that her 
relatives or community can plan in a controllable way. What may 
well be beyond their reach, however, is catastrophe. Suppose Mrs. Fs 
daughter becomes seriously ill herself and is unable to care for Mrs. I, 
or Mrs. I has expensive medical needs, or Mrs. I becomes demented 
(before she can herself qualify for citizenship) and so difficult that 
home care is impossible. The burdens any of these accidents might 
impose on Mrs. Fs family are unpredictable and far beyond the ordi­
nary expenses of care. Imposing obligations of support up to 125% of 
the poverty line on sponsoring communities or families is thus argua­
bly fair, whereas categorical exclusions from SSI or Medicaid are not.
Such unforeseen disasters, moreover, are possibilities for the 
general immigrant population, including immigrants arriving ready 
to work, as indeed they are for any American citizen. Celia Munoz, 
Deputy Vice President for Policy, National Council of La Raza, framed 
the argument this way:
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[Immigrants are] not superhuman . . . .  Some of them have acci­
dents. Some of them have illnesses. I think the fundamental 
question is, are we as taxpayers gonna support our immigrant 
neighbors who are also taxpayers, or are—have we chosen to treat 
them in a much, much different fashion. And the sad truth of it is 
that we are treating them in a very unfair fashion.73
Similarly, Representative Hinojosa’s example of a legal immigrant dis­
abled in an accident just before reaching the forty quarters required 
for exemption74 could be any working American.
The issue raised by such unforeseen disasters is whether it is fair 
to conceive of the principle of nondependency for immigrants as cov­
ering all contingencies, no matter how unpredictable or catastrophic. 
An arguably fairer alternative would be to understand 
nondependency as responsibility for the ordinary necessities of life 
over a working life span to the extent that the ability to work remains. 
On this alternative, those aspects of the safety net that cover unpre­
dictable and catastrophic needs should remain available, particularly 
SSI and Medicaid. Sponsorship obligations could similarly be con­
strued to encompass maintenance up to 125% of the poverty level, but 
not to include a contractual obligation to reimburse the federal gov­
ernment for receipt of means-tested benefits that cover any cata­
strophic events, such as unexpected disability or health expenses. 
This alternative is arguably fairer because it extends a safety net to 
those contingencies people cannot control, plan for, or save for. As it 
now stands, however, luck determines the difference between an im­
migrant who becomes eligible for benefits by obtaining citizenship or 
working forty quarters and an immigrant who remains eligible for 
benefits because of a disability.
There is an argument to be made from expectations here, too. 
Immigrants who come to the United States ready and able to work 
legitimately expect to be able to provide for themselves. They have no 
reason to believe that the contingencies that give rise to dependency 
will occur to them—that they will have a severely disabled child, that 
they will be hit by a truck, or that they will suffer from breast cancer. 
They do not expect to bear catastrophic costs, because they have a 
reasonable expectation that-life will go on without catastrophe. These 
are not, to be sure, expectations that the U.S. government has en­
couraged by long-standing policy. But they are expectations that a
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decent community would arguably encourage, at least to the extent 
the community is able. Decent communities cannot prevent catastro­
phes, but they can provide a safety net to cushion the effects of catas­
trophe. Immigrants newly arrived in the United States now face 
exclusion from this safety net.
IV. Conclusion
PRWORA threatened to exclude over one-half million legal im­
migrants in the United States, and all newly arriving immigrants, 
from the social safety net of SSI, food stamps, Medicaid, and other 
means-tested federal benefits. The BBA restored some of these bene­
fits (but not food stamps) to immigrants in the country before August 
22, 1996. Immigrants arriving after this date remain subject to 
PRWORA restrictions. These policies were justified by Congress in 
terms of the principles of nonencouragement and nondependency. I 
have argued, to the contrary, that there are good moral reasons for not 
understanding nonencouragement and nondependency to justify the 
exclusions. Legitimate expectations are an important reason for ob­
jecting to the reach of the PRWORA cuts. Fairness and ineffectiveness 
are two other reasons that tell against PRWORA. Although legitimate 
expectations do not provide an argument in quite the same way 
against the exclusion of after-arrivers from benefits, fairness and inef­
fectiveness do. The rules to be enforced under the BBA will neither 
prevent catastrophes from happening to people who are new to the 
United States nor provide them with the means to help themselves. 
On the other hand, it is fair—if less than compassionate—to expect 
immigrants or their sponsors to bear the controllable and expected 
costs of basic life maintenance, perhaps up to 125% of federal poverty 
guidelines. Congress should act to restore safety-net benefits at least 
to this extent. Perhaps the next step would be to reconsider whether a 
more compassionate society would insist on sponsorship require­
ments in the first place.
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